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Abstract: Controlling invasive species presents a public-good dilemma. Although environmental, social, and
economic benefits of control accrue to society, costs are borne by only a few individuals and organizations.
For decades, policy makers have used incentives and sanctions to encourage or coerce individual actors to
contribute to the public good, with limited success. Diverse, subnational efforts to collectively manage invasive
plants, insects, and animals provide effective alternatives to traditional command-and-control approaches.
Despite this work, there has been little systematic evaluation of collective efforts to determine whether there are
consistent principles underpinning success. We reviewed 32 studies to identify the extent to which collective-
action theories from related agricultural and environmental fields explain collaborative invasive species
management approaches; describe and differentiate emergent invasive species collective-action efforts; and
provide guidance on how to enable more collaborative approaches to invasive species management. We
identified 4 types of collective action aimed at invasive species—externally led, community led, comanaged,
and organizational coalitions—that provide blueprints for future invasive species management. Existing
collective-action theories could explain the importance attributed to developing shared knowledge of the social-
ecological system and the need for social capital. Yet, collection action on invasive species requires different
types of monitoring, sanctions, and boundary definitions. We argue that future government policies can
benefit from establishing flexible boundaries that encourage social learning and enable colocated individuals
and organizations to identify common goals, pool resources, and coordinate efforts.
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2 Invasive Species Control
Resumen: El control de especies invasoras es un dilema para el bien pu´blico. Aunque los beneficios am-
bientales, sociales y econo´micos del control se acoplan a la sociedad, los costos los resuelven unos cuantos
individuos y organizaciones. Durante de´cadas, los legisladores han utilizado incentivos y sanciones para
alentar y forzar a los actores individuales a contribuir con el bien pu´blico, aunque con un e´xito limitado.
Los diversos esfuerzos sub-nacionales para manejar colectivamente plantas, insectos y otros animales pro-
porcionan alternativas efectivas a las estrate´gicas tradicionales de comando y control. A pesar de esta labor,
ha habido una evaluacio´n sistema´tica mı´nima de los esfuerzos colectivos para determinar si hay principios
congruentes que este´n respaldando el e´xito. Revisamos 32 estudios para identificar la extensio´n a la cual las
teor´ıas de accio´n colectiva a partir de los campos agr´ıcolas y ambientales relacionados explican las estrategias
colaborativas de manejo de especies invasoras; describen y diferencian los esfuerzos de accio´n colectiva para
especies invasoras emergentes; y proporcionan una guı´a sobre co´mo posibilitar estrategias ma´s colaborativas
para el manejo de especies invasoras. Identificamos cuatro tipos de accio´n colectiva enfocada en las especies
invasoras – guiada externamente, guiada por la comunidad, co-manejada, y coaliciones organizacionales
– que proporcionan los planos para el manejo futuro de especies invasoras. Las teor´ıas existentes de accio´n
colectiva podr´ıan explicar la importancia que se le atribuye al conocimiento compartido en desarrollo sobre
los sistemas socio-ecolo´gicos y la necesidad de capital social. Aun as´ı, la accio´n colectiva sobre las especies
invasoras requiere de diferentes tipos de monitoreo, sanciones y definicio´n de los l´ımites. Argumentamos
que las pro´ximas pol´ıticas gubernamentales pueden beneficiarse del establecimiento de l´ımites flexibles que
alientan el aprendizaje social y permiten que individuos y organizaciones colocadas identifiquen objetivos
en comu´n, acumulen y compartan recursos y coordinen esfuerzos.
Palabras Clave: co-manejo, coordinacio´n, cooperacio´n, dilema social, especie invasora, especie no nativa,
participacio´n
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Introduction
Invasive species are mobile, have multiple vectors, and
ignore property, jurisdictional, and tenure boundaries.
They are a globally persistent and growing problem
for agricultural, forestry, aquatic, and natural systems
(Pimental et al. 2001; McGeoch et al. 2010). Econom-
ically, invasive species cause considerable losses to
agriculture, forestry, aquaculture, and livestock, and
management costs are high (Simberloff et al. 2005).
Ecologically, invasive species, second only to habitat loss,
drive species extinction (CBD 2013). Socially, invasive
species threaten ecosystem services and human well-
being (Pejchar & Mooney 2009). Researchers argue that
these impacts persist because invasive species manage-
ment has focused largely on individual-property solutions
at the expense of collaborative approaches that transcend
ownership and jurisdictional boundaries in a variety of
social-ecological systems (Epanchin-Niell et al. 2010;
Graham 2013; Ervin & Frisvold 2016). We synthesized
existing empirical research on invasive species collective
action to enhance understanding of how collaborative
approaches work in practice and to determine to what
extent they are consistent with, or go beyond, existing
collective-action theories and what lessons can be
learned to facilitate cooperative management of invasive
species.
Command-and-control legislation has formed the
foundation of invasive species policies in countries
such as Australia (Parsons & Cuthbertson 2001), Canada
(Zanden et al. 2010), and the United States (Zellmer
2000), despite the promise of alternative strategies
(Head et al. 2015). This approach is predicated on
the idea that incentives and sanctions are required to
make controlling invasive species the rational choice
for individual actors. Recently, policy makers have
acknowledged that this approach has not, and cannot,
achieve landscape-scale invasive species control (NSW
NRC 2014, 2016). Thus, new approaches are needed that
embrace shared responsibility and encourage collective
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Figure 1. Years of publication of 32
empirical research articles on local and
regional collective action in invasive
species management.
action across land tenures (e.g., NSW NRC 2014, 2016;
Great Britain Non-Native Species Secretariat 2015).
Theories about collective action have evolved substan-
tially from purely rational explanations (Olson 1965) to
more bounded approaches recognizing the importance
of other factors, such as the number and heterogeneity
of participants, face-to-face communication, trust, repu-
tation, and reciprocity (Van Vugt & Snyder 2002; Ostrom
2010). Research into the extent to which collective ac-
tion exists in invasive species management at subnational
scales and the constraints and opportunities to area-wide
cooperation is growing (Fig. 1). Yet, theoretical questions
remain about how contemporary collective-action theo-
ries apply to the specifics of invasive speciesmanagement
(Epanchin-Niell et al. 2010; Niemiec et al. 2016).
Coupling current policy directions with salient lessons
from the bounded-rationality approach and the 30-year
history of invasive species collective action research
(beginning with Tette et al. 1987) (Fig. 1) offers an
opportunity to provide a critical review of what has been
learned, suggestions for more effective application, and
prioritization of future research investments. We sought
to identify the extent to which collective-action theories
from related agricultural and environmental fields explain
collaborative invasive species management approaches;
describe and differentiate emergent invasive species
collective-action efforts; and provide practical guidance
on how future research, policy, and practice can
investigate and facilitate more collaborative approaches.
Based on our review, we summarized the theoretical
frameworks used to design and assess invasive species
collective actions and devised a typology of collective
responses to invasive species threats. We considered
opportunities to enhance theory and research on
invasive species public goods (PGs) and their application
across scales.
Need for Conceptual Clarity
Defining collective action is deceptively difficult.
Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004:200) suggest that, “what most
definitions have in common is that collective action re-
quires the involvement of a group of people, it requires
a shared interest within the group, and it involves some
kind of common action that works in pursuit of that
shared interest.” Collective-action problems can be con-
ceptualized as either common pool resources (CPRs) or
PG dilemmas. Both types of resources can be nonexclud-
able, meaning people cannot be prevented from enjoying
them. All PGs are nonexcludable, whereas only subsets
of CPRs are nonexcludable (Ostrom 1990). A CPR is rival-
rous such that consumption reduces availability for oth-
ers, whereas PGs are nonrivalrous (Olson 1965; Ostrom
1990; Kollock 1998). Further, CPR dilemmas require re-
straints on consumption, whereas PG dilemmas do not.
Conversely, PG dilemmas require contributions frompeo-
ple (Van Vugt & Snyder 2002), whereas this is true of only
a subset of CPR dilemmas (Ostrom 1990; Bisaro & Hinkel
2016). Despite the theoretical clarity between PGs and
CPRs, their boundaries can be blurry. Marine resources
are often cited as a classic CPR because it is difficult to
exclude users, even though a fish harvested by one per-
son cannot be caught by others (Ostrom 1990). National
defense is generally considered a PG because protection
enjoyed by one does not limit the protection enjoyed by
others (Apesteguia & Maier-Rigaud 2006).
There is widespread agreement that management of
invasive species constitutes a collective-action problem
(Epanchin-Niell et al. 2010; McLeod & Saunders 2011;
Yung et al. 2015). The challenges associated with pro-
moting collective actions tomanage invasive species are a
social dilemma that arises because invasive species freely
cross property boundaries, creating uncompensated
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interdependencies and externalities among spatially
proximate land managers (Cornes & Sandler 1996). Yet,
there is disagreement about which type of collective-
action problem invasive speciesmanagement constitutes.
Although some authors treat it as a CPR dilemma (e.g.,
Ervin & Jussaume 2014; Kruger 2016a) or argue it has
elements of both CPR and PG dilemmas (e.g., Ervin &
Frisvold 2016), more authors consider it a PG problem
(e.g., Ayer 1997; Perrings et al. 2002; Toleubayev et al.
2007; Coutts et al. 2013; Graham 2014).
We assert that invasive species control has 2 character-
istics that aremore consistent with PG dilemmas. First, in-
vasive species control requires contributions (e.g., adopt-
ing control practices and supporting local programs) by
actors in a system (acknowledged by Kruger [2016a]
but was not considered when she categorized invasive
species control as a CPR problem). In some cases, re-
straint is also required. For example, managing herbicide-
resistant weeds requires land managers limit (restrain)
their use of some herbicides (Ervin & Jussaume 2014;
Ervin & Frisvold 2016). However, restraint cannot solve
the overarching problem of invasive species manage-
ment; contributions are required to remove invasive
species. Second, invasive species management generates
environments free of invasive species, which are inher-
ently nonrivalrous (Kruger 2016a); one’s enjoyment of a
weed-free environment does not detract from another’s
enjoyment thereof (although noncontributors affect the
benefits contributors receive [Kruger 2016a]). The
distinctions between PG and CPR problems rest on
whether contributions or restraint are required and
whether benefits are subtractable (i.e., rivalrous). Al-
though such distinctions can sometimes be nuanced,
they define contexts in which human behaviors can vary
substantially (Kollock 1998; Bisaro & Hinkel 2016).
Still, investigations of environmental collective action
draw primarily from CPR, rather than PG, theories. From
Hardin’s (1968) “tragedy of the commons” and its subse-
quent critiques, dialogue in the conservation community
has primarily focused on CPRs. Specifically, Ostrom’s
(1990) 8 design principles for community-based pro-
grams, derived from examples of long-enduring CPR in-
stitutions, have had profound influence on the field. Simi-
larly, Ostrom’s (2009) 10 factors that affect self-organized
collective action stem from CPR examples and have been
employed in countless studies of environmental collec-
tive action. Meta-analyses of CPR institutions demonstrate
that each design principle is individually correlated with
successful CPR institutions (Cox et al. 2010) and that
some subsets result in more successful CPR institutions,
depending on mobility of the resource and amount of hu-
man effort required to manage it (Baggio et al. 2016). Al-
though governance arrangements that are most effective
for CPRs are likely to differ from PGs (Cox et al. 2010),
there has been little systematic consideration of which
design principles are applicable to PGs and under what
circumstances. In the case of invasive species manage-
ment, CPR-focused conceptual models have been applied
to investigations of invasive species collective actionwith
little consideration of whether they are appropriate given
that invasive species control is more consistent with PG
dynamics.
We sought to improve the science and practice of
invasive species control by describing ways collective
action has manifested and providing theoretical clarity by
evaluating the appropriateness of applying a CPR frame
to this PG dilemma. We evaluated whether Ostrom’s 2
conceptual models, originally developed through study
of CPRs, improve understanding of invasive species PG
problems. We also considered whether there are addi-
tional factors that supplement Ostrom’s models and help
explain collective action for invasive species control.
Overview of Invasive Species Collective-Action
Research
Seven of us met and discussed our understanding of
collective action in the context of invasive species
management. Our interpretation of collective action was
oriented toward subnational strategies that encourage
coordination, cooperation, and joint action, rather
than concurrent unilateral action (consistent with
Sadoff and Grey’s [2005] cooperation continuum). Our
interpretation of invasive species included invasive
plants, animals, and insects. We searched for articles that
discussed pest management because the terms pest and
invasive species are often used interchangeably (e.g.,
Epanchin-Niell et al. 2010; Ford-Thompson et al. 2012)
and because the mobility of pests also requires collective
solutions (Ervin & Frisvold 2016).
We identified 21 publications (Supporting Informa-
tion) related to collective action for invasive species
control. We reviewed these publications to refine our
conceptualization of collective action and develop a list
of search terms (Table 1). Subsequently, we conducted
a Scopus title-abstract-keyword search on 11 October
2016 and found 144 articles, from which we reviewed
those that reported social research about collective in-
vasive species management. Selected articles (32) repre-
sented environmental, agricultural, biological, and social
sciences and multidisciplinary fields.
We reviewed all articles for general characteristics,
such as geographic focus and invasive species of inter-
est, and to determine which PG and CPR theories, if
any, were used by authors to frame investigations. Two
authors independently coded each article to determine
whether Ostrom’s 10 factors or 8 design principles were
explicitly or implicitly identified as significant to the
achievement of collective action for invasive species con-
trol, consistent to Cox et al.’s (2010) and Baggio et al.’s
Conservation Biology
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Table 1. Search terms used to identify articles on collective action in invasive species management.
Collective action Invasive species management
“collective action” OR “cooperative control”
OR “community reciprocity” OR
“community participation” OR “centrally
organized” OR “community problem
solving” OR “community-based
conservation” OR “community-based natural
resource management” OR “collective
natural resource management” OR
“community-based comanagement” OR
“social dilemma”
invasives OR “invasive species” OR “alien species” OR
“non-native species” OR “non-indigenous species” OR
“exotic species” OR “introduced species” OR “biological
invasions” OR “biological invasion” OR bioinvasion∗ OR
“invasive animal” OR “invasive animals” OR “exotic animal”
OR “exotic animals” OR “feral animal” OR “feral animals”
OR “non-native mammal” OR “non-native mammals” OR
“introduced mammal” OR “introduced mammals” OR feral∗
OR “invasive plant” OR “invasive plants” OR pest∗ OR weed∗
OR biosecurity OR “noxious plant” OR "noxious plants”
(2016) approach.We also identified instances where CPR
approaches were inconsistent with the PG nature of in-
vasive species control. We agreed that a singular sum-
mary of invasive species collective action was inadequate
because of the diverse ways actors organized them-
selves and that a typology was more appropriate. Using
Uetake’s (2013) typology as a starting point, we revisited
articles to extract descriptions for 4 types of invasive
species collective control.
General Characteristics
Themajority of the 32 articles focused on invasive species
management in the United States and Australia (Support-
ing Information). Two studies included comparisons be-
tween the United States and Canada and Mexico. Four
studies focused exclusively on developing countries. One
article focused on continents rather than countries.
Conceptualizing Invasive Species Management as Common
Pool Resources or Public Goods
Articles presented divergent theoretical conceptualiza-
tions of invasive species management as a CPR, PG, or
nonspecific type of collective-action problem. Seventeen
studies labeled invasive species as a generic collective
action problem, 4 considered invasive species a PG
problem (Ayer 1997; Toleubayev et al. 2007; Graham
2014; Niemiec et al. 2016), 1 referred to invasive species
as a CPR problem (Kruger 2016a), and 1 acknowledged
that herbicide susceptibility has both PG and CPR
elements (Ervin & Frisvold 2016). The remaining 9
studies did not explicitly frame invasive species with
collective action theory or language, despite discussion
of cross-boundary issues or collective responses.
A small subset of CPR factors (Ostrom 2010) and
design principles (Ostrom 2009) were mentioned
consistently across articles (Tables 2 & 3). The 3 factors
most commonlymentionedwere number of users, norms
or social capital, and knowledge of the socioecological
system. The 3 design principles most consistently
referenced were monitoring, graduated sanctions, and
clearly defined boundaries. Despite this, there were
important differences between how these factors and
design principles were originally conceptualized in the
CPR literature and how authors applied them.
Some aspects of CPR theory referenced consistently
across articles are applicable to both CPR and PG prob-
lems. For example, reviewed articles emphasized the im-
portance of shared problem framing by stakeholders and
land managers. Common understanding of the social and
ecological contexts and threats posed by invasive species
was presented as important for establishing a shared vi-
sion and realistic goals (Thomsen & Caplow 2017). Thus,
many authors concluded that sharing information and
social learningwere necessary factors for addressing inva-
sive species problems (e.g., Ayer 1997; Toleubayev et al.
2007; Mead 2016). Trust and reciprocity were frequently
cited as necessary ingredients for effective collective re-
sponses to invasive species. Consistent with CPR theory,
authors emphasized that trust was important for facilitat-
ing communication (Graham 2013), developing a sense
of community responsibility (Yung et al. 2015; Marshall
et al. 2016), and social norms (Minato et al. 2010). Limits
to norms and trust were also recognized. For example,
norms facilitate mutual aid, but not other forms of collab-
oration (Niemiec et al. 2016), and trust between private
land managers and government staff can undermine col-
laboration among private land managers (Graham 2013).
Other identified factors reflected CPR theory but had
some features that highlighted the PG nature of inva-
sive species management problems. For instance, many
articles discussed the difficulty of coordinating a large
and diverse population of land managers, reminiscent
of the “number of users” factor established by Ostrom
(2009) as important for CPRs (e.g., Klepeis et al. 2009;
McLeod & Saunders 2011; Yung et al. 2015). Although
PG and CPR problems become more difficult with in-
creasing numbers of people involved, the reasons self-
organization becomes harder differ. With PG problems,
there are increased transaction costs associated with or-
ganizing large groups (Ostrom 2009), but the likelihood
of defectors is higher in large groups and is particularly
problematic in weakest link PG problems, where inva-
sive species control depends on contributions made by
the least (weakest link) willing actors (Hirshleifer 1983).
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Table 2. Results from coding each article against Ostrom’s (1990) design principles illustrated by long-enduring common pool resource
institutions.a
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Graduated sanctions + + + + - & - - + & + + +
Conflict-resolution mechanisms + - + +
Minimal recognition of rights to organize + + + + - + + + +
Nested enterprises + & + + + + +
aCodes: blank cell, design principle not identified. In the remaining cells, the design principle was identified: +, behaved as per Ostrom; –, did
not behave as per Ostrom; &, did and did not behave as per Ostrom; ∗, insufficient information to ascertain how the design principle operated.
bArticles spanned multiple forms of collective action.
Table 3. Results from coding each article against Ostrom’s (2009) 10 factors that affect self-organized collective action.a
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Knowledge of the socioecological 
  system + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Importance of resource to users + + + + + + + + + + + +
Collective-choice rules + + + + +
aCodes: Blank cell, design principle not identified. In the remaining cells, the design principle was identified: +, behaved as per Ostrom; &, did
and did not behave as per Ostrom;
∗
, insufficient information to ascertain how the design principle operated.
bArticles spanned multiple forms of collective action.
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More contributions are necessary to attain the PG (espe-
cially in threshold-aggregator problems, where benefits
do not accrue until enough contributions are made), and
the failure of some individuals to sufficiently contribute
may undermine cooperation through diminished percep-
tions of efficacy (Kollock 1998).
There are also important differences in the significance
attached to boundary definition. Boundaries around CPRs
are important for delineating resources, jurisdictional au-
thority, and access rights for users and nonusers. For
example, institutions that clearly define users and bound-
aries are more likely to be successful (Cox et al. 2010).
Similarly, having clearly defined users is a necessary con-
dition for success, especially for highly mobile resources
(Baggio et al. 2016). This differs from how boundaries
related to collective responses to invasive species control
where they inspired cooperation, established a scale for
the problem that seemed surmountable to local actors,
aligned with political boundaries, or leveraged resources
(Higgins et al. 2007; Donaldson & Mudd 2010). For ex-
ample, unclear boundaries of weed management areas
represent a missed opportunity to use boundaries to in-
spire cooperation and solidarity (Gunderson-Izurieta et al.
2008). Sometimes boundaries are presented as fuzzy (e.g.,
Ervin & Frisvold 2016) and expandable (e.g., Higgins et al.
2007; Bryce et al. 2011). Although CPR boundaries often
have a gradient quality to them, or are fuzzier than the
design principles imply (Cox et al. 2010), there has been
little consideration of how expandable boundaries can
be used to motivate greater participation in collective
action.
Monitoring and sanctions by regulators, 2 design prin-
ciples that lead to more successful CPR institutions (Cox
et al. 2010), were sometimes incompatible with the PG
nature of invasive species problems and undermined col-
lective efforts. Sustainable use of CPRs is ensured through
careful (and collaborative) governance of consumption.
For these resources, monitoring of user behavior and
the resource conditions by regulators accountable to the
users and associated graduated sanctions are essential
for detecting, preventing, and punishing unauthorized
behavior (Cox et al. 2010). In contrast, PGs are produced
through contributions. Sanctions can coerce contribu-
tions, but may undermine cooperation when access for
monitoring is not ubiquitously available. We found that
monitoring and sanctioning of individual behavior by
external agencies was onerous (Ervin & Frisvold 2016),
undermined cooperation within invasive species pro-
grams, and eroded trust among invasive species control
advocates and administrators (Hershdorfer et al. 2007;
Marshall et al. 2016), especially when monitors were
not accountable to the PG contributors (Graham 2013,
2014). Conversely, monitoring of the overall invasive
species abundance or distribution was critical to the
success of some invasive species control programs (e.g.,
Tette et al. 1987; de Groot 1995; Hershdorfer et al. 2007).
In meta-analyses of CPR studies, external monitoring of
user behavior and the resource condition are lumped
together. Our review suggests that for PGs, these 2 forms
of monitoring have different impacts on collective action.
Furthermore, we found that neighbor-to-neighbor, as
distinct from external, monitoring motivated contribu-
tions to the PG (e.g., Graham 2014; Niemiec et al. 2016),
especially in community-led collective action. More
research is needed to understand how different types
of monitoring and sanctions (i.e., behavior vs. resource
condition and external vs. neighbor-to-neighbor) affect
contributions to different types of invasive species
collective action and other PGs more broadly.
Four Types of Invasive Species Collective Action
Theoretical inconsistency was further complicated by
diverse descriptions of collective-action approaches to
invasive species control. Authors considered 4 types of
collective action: externally led, community led, coman-
aged, and organizational (summarized in Table 4). Differ-
ences between the types were not always clear because
articles lacked adequate information and because of the
diversity of deployment strategies.
Externally led collective actions were envisioned,
championed, and funded by agencies or organizations,
such as national, state, or local governments, inter-
national nongovernment organizations (NGOs), state-
sponsored extension programs, or university research
teams. These entities recognized the cross-boundary na-
ture of invasive species and invested in landscape-wide
solutions. External groups most often promoted the col-
lective interest by encouraging individual actions toward
a PG. Although in 1 case, a large centralized government
agency singlehandedly provided the PG (Toleubayev
et al. 2007). This type of collective action strongly re-
sembles the external agency-led type described by Ue-
take (2013), except that it often sought to organize rural
land managers in general (Klepeis et al. 2009), rather
than just farmers, and occasionally involved publically
and privately managed land of high conservation value
(Higgins et al. 2007).
The frequent aim of externally led collective action
was to facilitate individual land managers’ access to tech-
nology and assistance for addressing species invasions.
The high capacity and institutional support of these or-
ganizations afforded actions and investments generally
unavailable otherwise. Many developed unique science-
based solutions (e.g., universities), provided direct fund-
ing to land managers (e.g., state agencies), or facilitated
information sharing (Tette et al. 1987; Darin & Schoenig
2006; Bryce et al. 2011). However, with a reliance on
external funding and leadership, this type of collective
action rarely persisted after outside investments ended
(Tette et al. 1987; DeGroot 1995; Darin & Schoenig 2006;
Toleubayev et al. 2007).
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Table 4. Four types of collective action identified in the 32 articles reviewed.
Type Definition
Examples of individuals or organizations
leading collective efforts
Externally led External agencies or organizations envision, champion,
and fund efforts to promote widespread contributions
to invasive species control. Such efforts typically
include financial incentives or penalties or technical
support to landowners.
national, state, or local governments,
international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), state-sponsored
extension programs, or university
research teams
Community led Private landowners or residents provide support, apply
social pressure, or organize collaborative efforts with
other landowners to control invasive species across
property boundaries.
private landowners or residents
Comanaged Private landowners or residents enter in cooperative
arrangements with external agencies or organizations
to promote invasive species control at a landscape
scale. External agencies or organizations often
provide regulations and litigation, incentives,
technical assistance, or educational outreach.
agencies or organizations (e.g., state and
local government agencies, private
companies, NGOs, and universities) and
private landowners and residents
Organizational
coalitions
Institutions with a formal or informal mesolevel
authority and formal networks of government
agencies cooperate to control invasive species at a
regional scale. Such organizational coalitions
coordinate invasive species management programs
and activities, pool resources, encourage consistent
regulation and engagement, or facilitate management
at appropriate ecological scales.
organizations such as Cooperative Weed
Management Areas or Cooperative
Invasive Species Management Areas in
the United States (i.e., partnerships of
local, state, and federal government
agencies, private landowners, interested
stakeholders, and organizations with
environmental mandates)
Because externally led collective action largely encour-
aged independent, rather than collaborative or joint, ac-
tions (Sadoff &Grey 2005), none of the articles pertaining
to this form of collective action mentioned the need for
conflict-resolution mechanisms (Table 2) or predictable
dynamics of the socioecological system (Table 3). In-
stead, the emphasis was on monitoring to identify new
invasions and expanding project boundaries to involve
more individuals.
Externally led collective action sought cross-boundary
solutions to invasive species by emphasizing best man-
agement practices among independent actors. There is
strength in this approach because collaboration requires
investments that may overwhelm individual land man-
agers and outside entities can provide landscape-scale
perspectives on emergent threats. However, inspiring lo-
cal ownership of the problem and solution (Lachapelle &
McCool 2005) may help realize the benefits of external
investmentwhile ensuring program sustainability. For ex-
ample, programs might encourage individual responses
by local actors while enlisting local participation in pro-
gram leadership to build consensus around the need for
cross-boundary cooperation. Further, programs could so-
licit feedback and develop local capacity and revenue
to ensure program viability beyond the loss of external
support.
Community-led collective action typically involved
private landowners, residents, and sometimes public
land managers collaborating to control invaders, often
without government mandates or leadership. This form
of collective action arose from a shared understanding
among landowners that invasive species posed a
collective threat requiring coordinated management
(Berney et al. 2012; Stallman & James 2017). Such
community-led collective action was observed in rural
(Ravnborg & Westermann 2002; Herbert 2013), peri-
urban (Niemiec et al. 2016), and agricultural (Ayer 1997)
landscapes. It took diverse forms, including neighbors
sharing information and control strategies (Herbert 2013;
Niemiec et al. 2016), residents convincing neighbors to or
helping them control invasive species on their property
(Ravnborg & Westermann 2002; Herbert 2013; Yung
et al. 2015; Niemiec et al. 2016), cooperative scouting for
pest outbreaks (Stallman& James 2015), coordinated pes-
ticide application, release of biological controls, and crop
rotation across farms (Ayer 1997; Stallman& James 2015).
This type of collective action is consistent with Ue-
take’s (2013) nonorganization style because community
members collaborate without external involvement.
However, some land managers formed independent
organizations (e.g., Herbert 2013) and the norms and
social capital factor were no more important for this than
the other types of collective action (Table 3). No articles
mentioned the need for daily communication (Uetake
2013). Further, shared knowledge of the socioecological
system was less likely to be important (Table 3). This
indicates community-led collective action starts when
there is agreement that something needs to be done, but
ambiguity exists regarding who should make decisions
or what constitutes appropriate action (Brugnach
et al. 2011). For example, in 1 case, landowners
started cooperating once they began talking about the
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impacts inaction was having on each other, rather than
taking a systems perspective (Ravnborg & Westermann
2002).
Almost all CPR factors and design principles were
mentioned in the descriptions of community-led
collective action (Tables 2 & 3). Yet, there was little
overlap in the sets of factors or principles identified
in each article, which made it difficult to determine
whether any were consistently important. Some factors
supported or undermined community-led collective
action, depending on the social context. For example,
strong social norms and perceived reciprocity among
neighbors regarding invasive species control efforts
sometimes enabled collective action (Niemiec et al.
2016), whereas norms in rural areas against approaching
neighbors about landmanagement decisions undermined
cooperation (Ravnborg & Westermann 2002).
The articles reviewed suggested diverse strategies that
can facilitate community-led collective action. Several
studies highlighted the importance of community
workshops and organizations that facilitated socialization
among community members, information and resource
sharing, and informal agreements about invasive species
control behavior (Herbert 2013; Niemiec et al. 2016).
This was particularly important in places with high neigh-
borhood turnover and absentee landowners (Berney
et al. 2012; Yung et al. 2015). To help overcome existing
norms that militate against cooperation, organizations
and community leaders can highlight the transboundary
nature of invasive species control and the ecological
and economic benefits that can arise from cooperation
among neighbors (Ravnborg & Westermann 2002).
Cooperative arrangements between institutional
actors and land managers provided an alternative
approach for area-wide invasive species management.
Although Uetake (2013) considers this approach a
combination of the externally led and community-led
types, we argue it goes beyond the other 2 approaches
because it often involves polycentric governance. In
this type, organizational actors included state and local
government agencies, private companies, NGOs, and
universities, whereas individual actors were typically
private landowners. Cooperation could be induced
or motivated through diverse mechanisms, such
as regulations and litigation (Graham 2013, 2014),
incentives (Ervin & Frisvold 2016), technical assistance
and educational outreach (Kruger 2016a, 2016b), and
community-based approaches (Graham 2013, 2014).
Two features of comanaged collective action that set it
apart from self-organizing CPR arrangements were how
actors took advantage of resource-unit mobility to galva-
nize action and how a diversity of users were embraced.
For example, recognition of the ease with which invasive
speciesmove across the landscapewas used to unite orga-
nizations and individuals around a common goal (McLeod
& Saunders 2011; Graham 2013; Ervin & Frisvold 2016)
and instill a sense of community responsibility for manag-
ing invasive species (Mead 2016). Outreach and training
that embraced diverse actors served to promote trust,
communication, and opportunities for social learning and
action (Mead 2016).
One of the key challenges for this model of collective
action arose from the use of monitoring and sanctioning
of landholder behavior (Table 2). Articles that discussed
this type of collective action often focused on theweakest
link nature of invasive species management. Land man-
agers who participate in comanaged collective action of-
ten do so with the expectation that government staff will
use their enforcement powers to identify, work with, and
sanction those actors who are least prepared or willing
to manage invasive species (Graham 2013, 2014). Given
that regulations and enforcement tend to erode trust and
cooperation (McLeod & Saunders 2011; Marshall et al.
2016), it is challenging to work with unprepared or un-
willing land managers in a comanaged collective action
framework.
Policy makers and practitioners who wish to
encourage comanaged collective action should consider
prioritizing community-building activities and learning
opportunities that build trust among land managers and
external actors; demonstrate how resource mobilities
create interdependencies among diverse actors and
the need for a common goal; and encourage increased
participation by highlighting positive experiences
of participants and emphasizing multiple forms of
incentive (financial and nonfinancial) over enforcement
of sanctions. Further, investing in invasive species
management research that is interdisciplinary and
participatory can foster fair representation and shared
decision making among stakeholders and lead to socially
acceptable and accessible strategies.
Organizational coalition collective action included the
regional rearrangement of institutions with a formal or
informal meso-level authority (Donaldson &Mudd 2010),
as well as formal networks of government agencies and
other organizational actors (Gunderson-Izurieta et al.
2008; Thomsen & Caplow 2017) that aimed to address
invasive species concerns at a regional scale. These in-
cluded organizations such as Cooperative Weed Manage-
ment Areas or Cooperative Invasive Species Management
Areas in the United States, which were partnerships of
local, state, and federal government agencies, private
landowners, and various interested groups with a role
in invasive species management.
The coalitions ranged from administrative or
bureaucratic actions (e.g., networks of functionally
or administratively similar offices, centers, or agencies)
to community-based and informal collaborations. In
turn, collective action varied from highly formalized,
jurisdictionally specialized coordination to informal
initiatives that emphasized shared responsibilities and
accountability among a range of stakeholders and across
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jurisdictions. Like Uetake’s (2013) organization style,
which comprises organizations of farmers and agency
participants, we found that organizational-coalition
collective action largely comprised government agencies
and community members. Generally, we distinguished
organizational-coalition collective action from the
others by virtue of the collaboration being largely
between agencies and organizations, especially those
with environmental mandates. The purpose of such
organizational collaborations was to coordinate invasive
species management programs and activities, pool
resources, encourage consistent regulation and engage-
ment (Higgins et al. 2007), or facilitate management at
appropriate ecological scales (Thomsen&Caplow 2017).
This form of collective action involved organizations
with a shared understanding of the socioecological
system (Table 2). Possibly due to the scale at which
this form of collective action operated, and the
involvement of largely institutional actors, there was
little focus on system productivity or predictability,
resource unit mobility, graduated sanctions, or collective
choice arrangements (Table 3). Instead, the focus was on
functional aspects of these coalitions, such as themember
roles, communication, decision making, and planning
processes. Thus, success or failure of the coalitions
tended to be judged in terms of interorganizational or
individual characteristics rather than from a policy and
institutional analysis perspective (Donaldson & Mudd
2010). In other words, studies about organizational
coalition collective action generally stated or assumed
that invasive species management requires collective
action, although they included little or no discussion
about which model, types, and scales of collective action
were most appropriate, how these factors influenced
conceptions of success, or how the collaboration related
to existing bureaucratic and policy environments.
Future attempts to implement organizational coalition
collective action should clearly articulate objectives, iden-
tify why and what type of collective action is required,
and specify how success will be measured. It is impor-
tant for members to not just share a desire to resolve
an invasive species problem, but to clearly understand
their responsibilities within the coalition and the extent
of their jurisdiction. Success depends on establishing a
clear definition of the invasive species problem from the
outset as well as a management plan understood and
agreed upon by all coalition members.
Discussion
There is a developing, if nascent, interest in invasive
species research that goes beyond individual managers
and their practices to examine the relationships between
various actors in invasive species management and the
diverse configurations of collective action they form. Our
typology, which extends similar efforts by Epanchin-Niell
et al. (2010), Marshall et al. (2016), and Uetake (2013),
demonstrated the diversity of approaches to collective ac-
tion. These approaches have reoriented invasive species
policy, institutions, and management away from a nar-
row focus on educating and assisting individual managers
and enforcing invasive species regulations on individual
properties to more holistic, multiscalar, cross-boundary,
and collaborative efforts. In a broad sense, the works
we reviewed made valuable contributions to conceptu-
alizations of contemporary environmental management
problems (including invasive species) that are defined by
complexity and uncertainty and require inclusive, adap-
tive solutions (Woodford et al. 2016). Interorganizational
and intersectoral collective action strategies have become
more common, both as a policy tool for governments and
as a means for organizations and resource managers to
increase capacity, scope, and efficiency.
The articles reviewed provided insight for those seek-
ing to enhance collective responses to invasive species.
Local ownership (e.g., Lachapelle & McCool 2005) and
capacity, social and financial, were critical for collective
responses to endure, especially in instances where
external support was high, but not assured in perpetuity.
Financial capacity was important, but not sufficient
for success. For example, collective efforts thrived
when supported by normative beliefs among managers
and stakeholders that invasive species ought to be
controlled and that others were making investments
to do so. Agencies or community leaders can elevate
these normative beliefs with simple tools such as yard
signs, public commitments, and participatory mapping
(Niemiec et al. 2016) or existing communication
networks. Across articles, collective responses were
enhanced when stakeholders appreciated the cross-
boundary nature of the problem, were aware of the
benefits that might arise from coordinated action,
and were presented with achievable goals. Where
organizations collaborated, clear problem definitions
and roles of collaborators fostered more successful
responses. Efforts to enhance these contextual factors
are likely to boost collective invasive species control.
Although some of the invasive species collective action
research reviewed was linked to broader CPR theory, in
most cases these links remained opaque. Most articles
discussed factors commonly associated with successful
CPR collective action including norms and social capital,
shared knowledge of the socioecological system, moni-
toring, and third-party sanctioning (Tables 2 & 3). How-
ever, other factors identified as centrally or contextually
important for effective CPR collective action, such as col-
lective choice arrangements, low-cost conflict-resolution
mechanisms, and collective-choice rules, received less at-
tention (Tables 2 & 3). Thus, there is significant scope for
invasive species research to engage more substantively
with CPR collective-action theory and to clarify the type
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of collective-action problems that exist with respect to
invasive species and under what circumstances.
Invasive species management research could benefit
from more deliberate engagement with PG theory and
literature. Most reviewed articles uncritically engaged
CPR theory in their discussions about the need for
collective action in invasive species management. Our
findings suggest that although some elements of CPR
theory are relevant and applicable to collective control of
invasive species, others have been confounded with PG-
specific characteristics and dynamics (i.e., establishing
clear boundaries and number of users), and some may be
incompatible (i.e., agencies or organizations monitoring
and sanctioning individual behavior). More research
is needed to explore and detail the aspects of CPR
and PG theories that are complimentary when used
to investigate collective responses to invasive species,
which are contradictory, and, in cases of the latter,
which is more fruitful. The relevance of these questions
likely extends beyond invasive species control to other
environmental resources.
Invasive species control represents a complex, inter-
jurisdictional challenge that demands a range of collec-
tive actions linking diverse actors at various scales. This
collective action requires a diversity of expertise that is
functionally linked as an integrated system of manage-
ment or mitigation. Thus, questions regarding the diverse
forms of interactor collective action for invasive species
management become highly germane. There is a need to
better understand, connect, and model the conceptual
foundations, forms, and actions of such collectives as a
form of environmental network governance (Lubell et al.
2017).
Based on the results of our review, a key aim for the
development of invasive species policy and governance
should be to facilitate collective action between and
among landowners, organizations, and government
agencies to achieve management objectives at various
scales. The legislative and policy foundations of invasive
species management have remained largely unchanged,
and there is a mismatch between their focus on
individual-level action and the complex, transboundary
nature of invasive species and their management. There
is considerable scope for future research on invasive
species management to explore how policy and practice
can more substantively draw on, be evaluated through,
and contribute to rich bodies of existing theory and
knowledge concerning environmental governance and
collective action to empower effective responses to
invasions and realize desired ecological outcomes.
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